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Abstract Historically, the capability of predicting the future
has always been perceived as a matter of certain inequalities,
reflecting the initiation in or access to significant knowledge
with regard to the future. The prophet, the philosopher, the
statesman and the scientist are emblematic figures of such
cognitive hierarchies. The text addresses a problem which
has not been at the forefront of futures research attention,
but nevertheless it reflects some major changes in the domain
of foresight. A great deal of effort has been put in search for
adequate ways to handle the complexities of contemporary
life as well as to come to terms with the increasing unpredict-
ability of the future. The unstable societal dynamics chal-
lenges the traditional notions and practice of foresight. The
broader inclusion of diverse participants (experts, citizens,
stakeholders or nongovernmental activists) and their perspec-
tives has been seriously considered as a means to expand the
visibility of the future and promote firmer engagement with it.
The promise of а participatory approach in futures research
and its practical manifestations (with sometimes controversial
effects) are in the focus of the paper.
Keywords Participatory foresight . Planning .
Decision-making . Futures research
Introduction
The text addresses a problem which has not been at the
forefront of futures research’s attention, but nevertheless it
reflects some major changes in the domain of foresight. A
great deal of effort has been put in search for adequate ways to
handle the complexities of contemporary life as well as to
come to terms with the increasing unpredictability of the
future. What are the plausible means to achieve
foresightfulness as an individual’s capacity or as an organiza-
tional skill [31]? And why strengthening the participation-side
of foresight practice is having been recognized as part of the
solution.
It is clear that there is no single omnipotent foresight
method within the myriad of ways to anticipate the future—
neither statistically-based, nor intuition-driven. Futurists and
foresight practitioners continue, however, to try to elaborate
the most adequate tools to acquire knowledge and construct
meaningful images of the future. One possible way, it is
believed, is by providing a greater variety of perspectives
and ensure certain ‘knowledge encounters’ within the fore-
sight process. Broader participation may be ensured through
promoting a ‘participatory environment’; implementing ‘par-
ticipatory planning’ [13]; using ‘participatory methods’ [26];
stimulating ‘participative foresight’ [11]; organizing foresight
activities as a ‘participatory process’ [24, 29], etc.
Wider inclusion of agents, which are external for the fore-
sight realm, has constantly been pointed out as crucial for the
overall success of any foresight initiative. This reflects a
significant shift from the notion that far-(short)-sightedness
of individuals/organizations is the product of inevitable cog-
nitive or power hierarchies. The prophet, the philosopher, the
statesman, the scientist and the expert are all figures which
imply initiation into knowledge domains, which are one way
or the other significant for the process of fore-seeing the
future. It has recently being argued that this previously exclu-
sive process should open up to allow another type of agents
(with unprivileged perspectives). Currently, deficits faced by
expert knowledge (as privileged view) in explaining the com-
plexities of social reality become more obvious. Understand-
ing the nature of interactions between various realms of
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human activity, the environment and the science-and-
technology field turns into an enormous challenge not only
for holistic but also for small-scale analyses of social reality.
This imposes great difficulties for foresight practitioners.
Strengthening the participation element in futures research is
professed to, hopefully, complement expertise with flashes of
insight beyond the confines of codified knowledge.
The promise of the participatory approach in the futures
field and its practical manifestations (with sometimes contro-
versial effects) will be in the focus of the paragraphs that
follow.
Participatory approach in foresight: some preliminary
remarks
Why in the domain of futures research the idea to approach the
future in a more inclusive manner is gradually gaining
ground? What developments during the recent decades may
explain the need to secure the participatory side of foresight
and recognize the significance of non-expert viewpoints and
considerations?
To begin with, the neoliberal ‘engines’ of economic activ-
ity heavily rely on speedy organization of the innovation
process. The latter, along with flexibility, are at the heart of
contemporary mechanisms of value creation, in the pursuit of
profit to secure the immediate survival of market agents. In
such context quantitative foresight methods, such as trend-
extrapolation, often prove to be unreliable. Objects and pro-
cesses, which are of futures research’s concern, are known to
be dynamic and very unstable. It is hard to foresee innovation.
It is harder to anticipate its applications, how exactly con-
sumers will adapt those applications to their specific needs,
and what would be the profound societal consequences of its
integration in our daily lives. Expert knowledge often fails to
provide answers to those questions. To enrich the foresight
process with the perspective of the non-specialist or the stake-
holder is therefore perceived to be a necessary step towards
rationalization of the deep social and cultural consequences of
what Peter Druckur calls ‘organizing innovation as a systemic
process’ [9].
In addition to that, the remarkable development of infor-
mation and communication technologies provides plenty of
opportunity for speedy access to information, research and
knowledge, and secures the infrastructure for exchange (of
opinion and advice) and cooperation between diverse agents
in solving particular problems. The trans-disciplinary1 char-
acter of knowledge, generated this way, is believed to be a
valuable source of prognostic perspectives, while overcoming
the disciplinary narrow-mindedness of the specialist. This
could be regarded as an element of a continuing process of
democratization. The raised awareness among the members of
civil society results in claims for deeper participation in the
political process—to consult decision making, to raise their
objections and to perform functions which have usually been
the responsibility of official authorities. It does not mean that
the flourishing of the ICT sector inevitably ensures fully-
fledged participatory democracy in which every citizen could
have the say on future-related matters. It only provides chan-
nels for the emergence of agents which might potentially
impact the dynamics of the social realm. The combined effect
of strategies, actions, cross-impact, counter-reactions, public
initiatives, etc. of those agents could compromise the accuracy
of experts’ judgments on the future. Nowadays, it is difficult
to grasp causality in increasingly non-equilibrium social sys-
tems. Foresight efforts have become deeply troubled, consid-
ering that cause, consequence and effect could hardly be
discriminated and traced.
This understandably disturbs the exercise of power since
power-holders seem troubled to acquire reliable knowledge
about the future, which diminishes their far-sightedness and
ruling capacities. As a result, accounts about political decen-
tralization, the inadequacy of rigid hierarchical structures and
the compromised competence of the elite, appear regularly in
the public discourse. They point at the eroded governmental
expertise and at the inability of official institutions to keep
pace with the expanding ‘decision load’. The perception that
the social reality is rapidly increasing its complexity further
exacerbates the problem of how to react adequately and in a
timely manner for administering the various aspects of social
change. It is not surprising, then, that very specific narratives
emerge in an attempt to reestablish elite-citizenry relation-
ships. In all their variants they argue for more active partici-
pation of citizens in the political process by making contribu-
tion to the formulation of policies which directly affect them.
This is commonly interpreted as an opportunity for more open
(non-elitist) approach in contemplating and deciding about the
future. In effect, the burden of political responsibility would
be shared between the ruled majority and the ruling minority.
The abovementioned developments outline the context in
which ensuring a broader participation in foresight activities
has been justified. A participatory approach requires the in-
clusion of agents, which have traditionally been considered
‘external’ for the foresight endeavor. On the one hand, these
could be individuals who do not have specific expertise in a
given area (laymen) but are interested in or affected by its
dynamics with regard to the future. On the other hand, those
could be specialists, who are not educated in the discipline
which is usually referred to as one providing expertise on the
question at issue. As a consequence, they have often been
denied access to public discussion, deliberation and subse-
quent policy making.
1 Trans-disciplinary is used in the sense of one beyond disciplines (in a
dialogue with the public). It is not the same as inter-disciplinary (an
encounter of legitimate disciplines’ positions).
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‘Participatory foresight’ will be used hereafter to signify
one aiming at wider inclusion of experts, citizens, stake-
holders or nongovernmental activists, in the process of antic-
ipating and planning the future. It has to be noted that such a
definition reveals the normative nature of the concept. Les-
sons derived in practice, however, show that, at least for the
time being, deep engagement with ‘external’ participation is
rare and very difficult to achieve.
Participatory foresight: idea and practice
Arguing a ‘participatory’ element in the domain of foresight is
not a recent stance on the matter. Actually, the mere linguistic
and conceptual turn from ‘forecasting’ to ‘foresight’, which
has happened few decades ago, assumes the existence of such
an element, as long as the future ceased to be exclusively a
matter of expert judgments with strong claims of prognostic
accuracy. ‘Foresight’ is currently the common word for ‘fu-
tures research’; additionally, ‘it has become a vogue word for
some successful participatory, future-oriented activities’ (Alaćs
[1], p.109). However, there is a line of argumentation which
insists that such general reference is inadequate, and that
foresight, forecasting, and even planning [7] are coexisting
but quite different ways to approach the future. Nevertheless,
Foresight has been gaining prominence as a regularly orga-
nized endeavor by institutions in Germany, Japan, The United
Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, etc. Its goal is to bring
together viewpoints of key agents for some better understand-
ing of drivers and forces that shape the middle- and the long
term future, in order to elaborate informed strategic visions or
action plans. Furthermore, Foresight, it is claimed, should not
only result in agenda-setting but also in creating durable com-
munication channels for subsequent interaction between the
participants. New technologies allows for it to function as a
form of networking [25], which is supposed to ensure engage-
ment with the discussed problems and further involvement in
pursuing the practical goals which have been agreed during the
exercise (Foresight Methodologies Textbook [13], p.76; The
Potential of Regional Foresight: Final Report [29], p.11; Beck-
er [3], p.7). Foresight has been defined as a ‘policy response’ to
the emergence of knowledge-based societies (Miles et al. [20],
p.22).Wewill not explore the empirical adequacy of the phrase
‘knowledge-based society’. We will just assume that it de-
scribes a situation in which prognostics in all its forms suffers
serious deficits in view of identification and interpretation of
the relevant information. Therefore, the Foresight process is
being proposed as a helping tool to acquire valuable knowl-
edge in order to inform decision-makers when they formulate
future policies. It is exactly the participatory component, which
is being appreciated.
And this appreciation of opening up the futures field is not
new. It can be traced back to the years after World War II,
when Ossip Flechtheim [12], who introduced the term ‘futur-
ology’, suggested that serious occupation with the future
should go beyond the grasp of both ideology and utopia. He
insisted that this then new research be incorporated in the
educational system and futurology be taught as any other
scientific discipline. At this point we may interpret his gesture
as an appeal for temporal (with regard to the future) opening
up of the scientific realm, for radicalization of the modern
rationalization process in an attempt to lift the science-based
foresight up to new limits. Given the experiences between and
during the two wars, and the shameful consequences of an
ideology-based approach to the future, it is not surprising that
Flechtheim’s idea is for the future to findmore impartial wharf
(the scientific field) and take on the task to raise awareness on
looming threats. It is well known how unthinkable WorldWar
I seemed to be until it actually happened; or, how detrimental
the shortsightedness of Neville Chamberlain and the European
powers was with regard to Hitlerism. Flechtheim’s original
appeal was for promoting the exploration of the future through
academia—beyond the religious prophetic revelations, the
failed political rationality, the artistic image of the future or
the scientist’s ‘speculating about the future’ [5].
The ‘teaching moment’ in foresight practice (with the aim
to ensure its participatory profile) will have other manifesta-
tions over time. Alvin Toffler, for example, suggested very
interesting one in a book from 1970 [30]. Within the narrative
of Futureshock he raised his concerns about the pace of
change in contemporary developed societies and pointed to
the difficulties which this situation produces with regard to
adaptation. He argued that human beings are not capable of
facing such acceleration without suffering harm. Toffler rec-
ommended not only opening up the field of foresight but,
unlike Flechtheim, he advocated its popularization among
the general public. He insisted that the development of a habit
to anticipate the future, across all levels of the social realm, is
crucial. Kindergartens, schools, governments and internation-
al organizations should cultivate a passion for the future, in
order to challenge short-termism, narrow-sightedness, the
pursuit of immediate results and disregard for the social and
cultural features of the context. In other words, nurturing what
he calls ‘anticipatory democracy’ would overcome the detri-
mental consequences of technocratic elitism in forecasting.
Thus, the future needs to return into experience . Toffler
insisted that this is the only way to adapt to the vertigo of
contemporary social change. His considerations were not that
theoretical but practical, even therapeutic (as long as they
provide remedy for a very specific illness of our time).
A very similar participatory argument, in favor of the
inclusion of foresight in the educational process, has also been
supported by the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF,
est. 1967). Currently, the federation works in collaboration
with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) in developing school and teaching
Eur J Futures Res (2014) 15:33 Page 3 of 9, 33
books for different educational levels [33]. One of the doyens
in WFSF, Eleonora Masini has her own understanding for
implementing participatory foresight. She is well-known in
the futures research community to have argued the founda-
tions of visioning as a specific form of anticipating the future.
Visioning is about building constructive images of the future
and about detecting the ‘seeds of change’—those weak signals
in the present which may help us contemplate or create alter-
native, preferable futures [19].Masini had been advocating for
women and children’s participation in foresight practices. She
insisted that the process of visioning be open for groups,
whose thinking is ‘outside the box’. Within her intellectual
strategy, asociality is explored as a generator of valuable
images of the future. Thus, participatory foresight is one that
welcomes the figure of the outsider, the individual who chal-
lenges the boundaries of sociality, to detect the seeds of
change for some ‘other tomorrow’. Children, for example,
could be very helpful since they are an embodiment of the
sociality-to-be and its specific imagination. Some women/
housewives would also be valuable participants since they
could contribute from the perspective of their denied public
inclusion. This version of participatory foresight aims to over-
come dominant discourses on the future, which are part of the
reproduction mechanisms of the social system itself, and to
compensate the shortcomings of commonsensical future-
related narratives.
In the last 20 years we witnessed the emergence of some
interesting techniques in the foresight realm, ones which
combine the achievements of post-structuralism in social the-
ory with enhanced participation. One such form of exercising
critical thinking on the future, through involvement of stake-
holders in the process, is the Casual layered analysis,
pioneered by Sohail Inayatullah. It attempts to engage the
participants in a given foresight initiative with thorough de-
construction and genealogy of a problem, not with the intent
to infer a particular image of the future but to open up some
conceptual room to construct desirable alternatives . The Ca-
sual layered analysis has been implemented in seminars ded-
icated to pressing public problems or to visioning the future
development of a client organization [15]. During such exer-
cises, participants are asked to discuss the question at issue
and reflect on: 1/ public perceptions and biases (usually cov-
ered by the media); 2/ economic, cultural and historical fac-
tors, and their explanation (publicly circulating interpretations
of empirical data); 3/ the discourse which legitimized the
established structures; 4/ the level of the metaphor/myth
which represents archetypes—the unconscious dimensions
of the problem [16]. Each of these layers unfolds some room
for many possible futures. Historicizing certain notions helps
participants to overcome fatalistic attitudes towards history,
the idea of predetermination and current interpretations of
reality which employ dubious categories. Casual layered anal-
ysis is a way to approach the future having in mind the
existing ‘knowledge-power’ structures. Some zealous theore-
ticians would argue that the method actually vulgarizes critical
social theory. That would probably be correct. Nevertheless, it
does not deny the fact that it produces significant educational
effect on the foresight participants. It provides a means to
pluralize the agency of those employing critique to ‘disturb
the foundations of social reality’ in other to construct a plu-
rality of possible futures. It seems that putting pressure on
some notions undermines the mere idea of a future. However,
it charges it with alternate meanings. The conceptual space of
the future is believed to perform the function of tabula rasa
for the human mind’s creativity in transcending current trends
mentally and imagine states of the world, which are, so to
speak, ‘constitutive outside’ for the actual social life. The
experience with the Casual Layered analysis is instructive:
foresight could be practiced in the form of politico-philosoph-
ical reflection by a wide range of participants.
When we discuss the participatory aspects of foresight,
along with the changing profile of participants, their overall
number changes too. The advancement of communication
technologies and the deep expansion of Internet, provide
opportunities to include more and more individuals in the
foresight process, irrespectively of their current geographical
location. This gives rise to various futures applications—from
on-line instruments to harness the so-called “wisdom of
crowds”, to extended endeavors in aggregating expert judg-
ments on highly uncertain matters. Prediction markets [27]
and Real-Time Delphi [28] are cases in point. However, they
both have unresolved problems with regard to motivation and
perseverance of the participants.
All the examples above do not exhaust the myriad of
‘inclusive’ cases in the field. Since participatory foresight
implies a specific way of approaching the problem of our
adequate relation to the future, it will continue to employ a
variety of methods and tools [26]. It does not denounce well-
known methods for collective foresight such as Delphi or
brainstorming, which were elaborated after World War II. It
just extends them to participants with viewpoints, which do not
comply with the traditional approaches (scientists’ and indus-
trialists’) to a given problem. It also provides alternative means
for futures-oriented interaction, such as online platforms or, in
the case of spatial planning in Europe—geo-visualization [32].
Usually foresight practitioners experience difficulties when
they try to come up with adequate ways to identify and
analyze the relevant information about the future development
of an object or a process. Notwithstanding the chosen fore-
sight method—trend-extrapolations, expert panels, modeling,
‘the wisdom of crowds’ or any other, every prognostic en-
deavor suffers a fundamental weakness. The image of the
future, which each foresight method produces, relies on the
available information. It is usually incomplete, distorted or
misleading, or to put it briefly, imperfect. Thus, every state-
ment regarding the future, as a prognosis, is valid only to an
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extent of certainty. This is not the case with narratives, which
claim to be predictions as long as they emanate from a sup-
posedly perfect source of information, such as God for the
prophetic revelation.
In general, foresight practice deals with the unknown in its
attempts to anticipate what might come. It could be limited to
mere contemplations with regard to the future and have only
exploratory claims. Or, it could be further unfolded into a
planning act, which would transform it into a normative
endeavor. Exploratory methods do not necessarily require
explicit engagement with creating the future. This is not the
case with the act of planning as ‘ahead’-oriented strategy,
which aims to materialize an image of the future into reality,
in order to alleviate the hardships of anticipating it.
These are the main lines of the conceptual framework of
the futures research field, within which we observe the recent
re-thinking of the adequate profile of agents, who take part in
foresight activities. In spite of the great variety of intellectual
strategies in explaining the role and essence of foresight,
practically we may boil them down to exploratory and nor-
mative. They employ different techniques, which reflect spe-
cific interrelation between the foresight practitioner and the
object of futures inquiry.
In the case of exploratory foresight there is a clearly
established research distance. The future is perceived as a
forthcoming state of an object or a process, and we could
articulate our suggestions relying on the merits of our obser-
vational distancing. The products of exploratory foresight are
probabilistic analyses. All exploratory methods have advan-
tages as well as shortcomings with view of selection of rele-
vant information and value of the achieved results. Both
qualitative and quantitative methods are being employed
(trend extrapolation, expert methods, scenarios, grand social
theories, etc.) for that end.
When claims for more significant public’s presence in ex-
ploratory foresight are raised, they are founded on assumption
that the interrelation between the foresight practitioner and the
object of futures inquiry could be enriched. Expanding the
range of participation by promoting a variety of perspectives
would produce valuable and useful results. That, for example,
explains why The US National Intelligence Council within
15 years (1997–2012) published five reports on the global
future [21], in which gradually expanded the range of the
included in the process subjects. Global Trends 2010 (1997)
was a report made by the intelligence community and was
publicly discussed in meetings with business and academia;
Global Trends 2015 (2000) was a product of collaboration
with nongovernmental experts; Global Trends 2020 (2004)
included the perspectives of foreign specialists; Global Trends
2025 (2008) expanded the external participation and promoted
discussions mediated by Internet. Currently, Global Trends
2030 (2012) is a subject to continuous international dialogue
through a specially designed blog for the purpose.
Exploratory foresight approaches the future as a context,
whose characteristics should be anticipated in order to main-
tain a state of preparedness for what might happen. Norma-
tive foresight, on the other hand, implies deeper engagement
with the future. Its aim is to find ways for agents to interfere
with current developments in order to re-direct them in accor-
dance with some idea, goal or norm. The foundations of
normative foresight lay in the desire to re-create the very
context. It is no surprise then that planning is believed to be
irreplaceable element of normative foresight practice. How-
ever, the claim to create the future cannot escape limitations
with regard to power. Shaping reality requires resources and
management. This raises the question about who could possi-
bly provide them. It is well known that endeavors such as the
Manhattan project or Apollo program would not have been
successful without the enormous planning and implementa-
tion effort made by a powerful agent, namely, the federal
government of the USA. Despite that, with the triumph of
neoliberal economic ideology since the 70’s, not only the
practice but even the language on state planning has been
discredited. ‘Normative foresight’ is turning into a euphemism
which allows for exploring the phenomenon of central plan-
ning without the sanction of the commonly accepted ideolog-
ical discourse2.
Sometimes normative foresight is used to designate the
elaboration of speculative3 images of the future which are
the result of attempts to restore the importance of utopian
thinking. They are inevitably ideologically charged, since they
place a norm/value as a long-term goal and consider pathways
to connect this ideal point in the future with the current state of
affairs. Actually, these backcasting exercises are mental ex-
periments, which employ quite different approach in compar-
ison with traditional research methods. Of course, it has to be
noted that essential normative foresight, as ‘in advance’ en-
gagement with the future, is incomplete without the help of
exploratory foresight methods. They provide initial infor-
mation about the context in which the planning effort is to
take place. They are also indispensable in the process of
goal-setting.
In the case of normative foresight, to strengthen the partic-
ipatory side of the process means to ensure a deeper engage-
ment with the future. Usually this is being done by allowing
citizens, be they stakeholders, non-specialists, and concerned
individuals, to impact the process. The idea to include the
laymen’s perspective and to engage them in the subsequent
implementation of plans, interestingly, coincides with the rise
and increasing popularity of politico-philosophical theories of
2 The commonly accepted neoliberal ideological discourse omits the fact
that the success of certain private sector initiatives could also be regarded
as a byproduct of central planning projects: space programs—for inno-
vations in aviation and medicine, the military sector—for Internet, the
road infrastructure in the United States, etc.
3 Under ‘speculative’ it is meant ’contemplative’.
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deliberative, participative and collaborative democracy. Those
three versions of democracy are conceptualized as necessary
in order to reinvent the relations between elites and citizens in
response to the failures of contemporary representative de-
mocracy. Intentionally or not, the idea of foresight as a partic-
ipatory process has been recently appearing in various official
documents and reports to be pointed out as one of the means to
ensure deeper citizen participation, thus strengthening democ-
racy. There are actual attempts to involve the citizen in initia-
tives with regard to the future: municipal budget planning in
Brazil [23], mass meetings to direct local investment in Sal-
vador, urban management in the Philippines [6], etc.
Participatory foresight and knowledge deficits
Identifying and processing relevant information with regard to
the future is crucial for the foresight process. We inhabit a
world in which massive amounts of data are produced every
day, especially in the so-called developed countries. Those
same data are believed to represent pieces of accurate self-
description of contemporaneity, which reveal some underly-
ing logic in the complex social processes or grasp the gist of
what has often being referred to as ‘the historical process’.
‘Knowledge’ is ardently debated notion. Sometimes it is
regarded as helpful in organizing the efficient performance of
different social realms. In other cases it is a source of hope for
successful handling of global problems, including the desper-
ate state of affairs in some less developed countries. Or, it has
been regarded as a source of destruction—one that threatens
the survival of humanity because it carries risks and poses
dangers which the human beings will not manage to neutral-
ize. These turbulent times challenge the observer’s ability to
follow the dynamics of events to a point when the possibility
to build a proper capacity for orientation, in order to acquire
valuable knowledge about the future, has been compromised.
Moreover, we are all finite cognitive agents, i.e. something
will always be missing in our assumptions about every object
of research inquiry. Recently, this problem has been exacer-
bated, due to the effects of economic deregulation and the
speedy innovation process. It seems that surprise is the new
driving force within the various realms of human experience.
And this is a peculiar situation as contemporary knowledge
societies seem to be operated by non-knowledge (surprises).
Uncertainty causes profound gap between the theoretical con-
cept of ‘knowledge society’ and reality. One of the founders of
the notion of knowledge society, Daniel Bell, believed that
integrating codified theoretical knowledge in the management
of different social realms would have led to efficient solution
of pressing problems in the post-industrial society [4]. Knowl-
edge, however, turned out to be not that benevolent, socially
engaged and predictable. Interestingly enough, political rhe-
toric and official documents of national, international and
supranational level, insist that the term ‘knowledge society’
not only describe current realities in economically developed
societies but also represent a program, a normative goal with
regard to the evolution of all countries. Despite this deep
political engagement with the term, it is not quite clear what
exactly the word ‘knowledge’ denotes within the famous
phrase. Thus, it has been approached rather intuitively.
To begin with, knowledge could cover a wide range of
achievements—from what is being regarded as scientific
knowledge to certain forms of local, tradition-inspired,
culture-bound knowledge for handling specific problems. At
the same time, there are appeals for knowledge to be intro-
duced as organizing principle in all public activities. It can
function not only as an independent endeavor in search for
abstract truth, but also as intentional pursuit of practical truths,
which to be applied in everyday life. Furthermore, knowledge
ought not to be perceived exclusively as positive science. In
general, it provides orientation andmeaning with regard to our
existence. Given that, the realm of the magical for priests, the
divine transcendent authority of God for prophets, the human
reason for the Enlightenment philosophers are all sources of
knowledge. Never should be ignored the relation between
knowledge and power. All those figures, which were initiated
in specific knowledge, were agencies of power. Today, such a
figure appears to be the scientist with his deep reliance on
experiment and empirically based hypotheses. But then again,
what happened to that knowledge-power relation so that it
became important to engage the ‘outside’ perspective, stem-
ming from the layman, the citizen, the non-specialist.
Currently, the realm of human experience is multilayered
and complex. The process of solving its riddles requires a
broader range of viewpoints. The inclusion of ‘outside’ per-
spectives (as alternative to some constructed ‘right to ana-
lyze’) is regarded as a means to compensate the shortcomings
of expertise and any other disciplinary knowledge with strong
claims for reliability. The role of the laymen is to bring the
specialists’ knowledge down to earth and foresee its possible
side-effects in everyday life. Thus they would illustrate the
whole complexity of the social and cultural consequences,
caused by the triumph of advanced techno-knowledge. The
outsider is supposed to give voice to anxieties generated by
the expansion of the so-called instrumental reason4, which is
interested primarily in the efficacy of a decision rather than the
long-term social costs. Therefore, ‘knowledge deficits’ started
to be attributed to the expert or the scientist. Ignorance is not
the preserve of the general public any more. Such an under-
standing is part of recent debates about the form of
4 It is interesting that some notable representatives of the instrumental
reason feel uneasiness in the face of their own achievements. Bill Joy,
cofounder of Sun Microsystems, in an article entitled ‘Why the Future
does not need us?’ articulates deep concern about the long-term conse-
quences of technological progress. He warns that the logic of the latter
would eventually lead to its own emancipation from humans [17].
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relationship between science and society, and the appeal of
scientists such as Helga Nowotny and Michael Gibbons for
what they call socially robust knowledge [22]. They argue the
need for ‘new deal’ [14] between knowledge and society, one,
which would renegotiate their previous responsibilities, in
order to respond to the increasing complexity of contemporary
societies, the vague demarcation boundaries between univer-
sal and industrial science, and between fundamental and ap-
plied knowledge. That is why citizens should be allowed to
participate in the formulation of problems and contribute to
the achievement of satisfactory solutions. Knowledge needs to
become engaged with the social realm [10]. It is necessary to
strive to socially-oriented truths.
In this context, foresight knowledge has its own specific
problems. First of all, many foresight methods rely on statis-
tical data to elicit relevant information about the future. The
problem is that traditional frequency statistics has attracted
severe criticism recently. Meanwhile, the so-called Bayesian
statistics is gaining popularity as alternative foresight tool (for
example, to predict the outcome of presidential elections).
Additionally, the common indicators, which traditional fre-
quency statistics applies, are regarded as inadequate for grasp-
ing important global phenomena. Conceptually, in the realm
of social sciences, theoreticians such as Ulrich Beck, David
Held or Martin Albrow react by criticizing the evident meth-
odological inertia in the social sciences and the futility of
some well-established notions. They suggest cosmopolitan-
ism to become the new analytical framework for the global
age. For that end, it would be advisable to attempt at con-
structing new indicators or to operationalize the current ones
in a different manner. For instance, the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) is believed to be the utmost economic indicator but
it should take into account non-monetary services, ecological
damage and social inequalities [8]. This is important since a
reliable foresight is founded on reliable knowledge about the
present.
Arguing the inclusion of diverse participants in various
foresight practices is part of a more fundamental process of
transformation in contemporary societies. Reflection, which
was previously ensured by the researcher’s distance, stumbles
on the threshold of complex social reality. The perspective of
‘those who know’ needs to be complemented by that of the
‘unenlightened’ in some specialized knowledge. This explains
why foresight has renounced its scientific claims (as forecast-
ing) and became ‘an art that may draw on methods that stem
from the traditions of science‘(Miles et al. [20], p. 41).
We can outline two main ways to promote the participatory
side of foresight activities:
& by ‘expertise dialogue’, which aims at inter-disciplinary
cooperation. It is a proper way to avoid some problems
stemming from the compartmentalization of science,
which was long ago identified by Jean-Francois Lyotard
in his famous report on knowledge [18]. The need to push
for formation of inter-disciplinary discourse is generated
by a very peculiar anxiety about the lost language of
science and the fact that its different spheres have special-
ized so deeply that can hardly communicate. The ‘exper-
tise dialogue’ is valuable as long as it provides opportunity
for various research perspectives to focus around one
theme (the future of an object or a process) and attempt
to re-arrange their tongues and meaning codes for a better
understanding of the issue at question.
& by ‘social dialogue’, which aims at inclusion of stake-
holders (they might be directly or indirectly concerned)
in a public discussion within the framework of a deliber-
ative process. The overall goal is to induce cooperation
and also to inform citizens on key issues which are to be
decided. This would allow contemplating on dimensions,
unlikely to be discussed in the regular decision-making
process. The ambition is not to predict the future, but to
reach a better understanding around possible and prefera-
ble futures. This has its power misuses, as long as every
image of the future potentially serves some ideological
construction. But it also could be an alternative room away
from the discredited political realm. Although traditional
ideologies rely on the image of the future as a space to
materialize their respective politico-philosophical ideals
(which is part of the legacy of the Enlightenment), the
futures studies realm could be used to overcome the non-
credibility of the so-called ‘grand narratives’. Thus ‘social
dialogue’ in foresight is imagined as one that promotes
deliberation between various representatives individuals
of a society about the future which could be created, not
that which should be reached.
We face a curious development. Due to knowledge deficits
in government, expertise and business, regular citizens are
expected to inform the elites. Knowledge is perceived as one
dispersed among the different levels of social hierarchy and
not concentrated on its top. Therefore, it has been argued, the
very consumers of policies should be incorporated in the
process of discussion and planning. That is why various forms
of networking are encouraged in order to grasp signals from
diverse levels/spheres/sides of social reality and organize
dialogues to compensate existing communicational gaps. Ad-
ditional factors contributed to this shift. One of them is that
policy measures very rarely comply with those expected by
the public. Neither do their outcomes. For power-holders the
possibility for long-term planning seems denied, but the long-
term perspective still has to be hold because it is needed for
efforts to maintain the very power mechanism. In view of the
alienation between elites and all the rest, engaging the general
public (laymen, NGOs, specialists, stakeholders) with deeper
participation in the political process, is believed to strengthen
the legitimacy of the decision-making process. There are some
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doubts about the benevolence of such gestures of letting the
laymen, at least procedurally, to give their contribution in
resolving the problem about the future and deliberate on its
possible directions. Apropos, the mere idea about deliberation
presupposes a communicational situation, which should aim
at overcoming all communicational distortions. It requires a
discussion among rational agents, which would allow for the
evolution of their initial positions, in order to reach a shared
resolving of a particular problem. This, of course, is an ideal
situation, a theoretical construct, which may serve as reference
point and direction for actual activities. But the actual possi-
bility to misuse the desire of the general public to take part in
foresight activities still stands.
This might be observed in cases in which the official
institutions manage the deliberation process between experts
and citizens. Sometimes they adeptly retreat from the lime-
light but still provide rules and requirements which shape the
specialists’ perspective. As a result, experts turn into advo-
cates of policies which they have not designed, and power
elites use them to buffer possible public resentment. The
experience with the reconstruction planning of New Orleans,
in the aftermath of the Katrina disaster, is a case in point. It had
been made an attempt for organizing a form of normative
foresight and use input from the inhabitants of different neigh-
borhoods to envision the future architectural environment of
the city. Eventually, the planning process had transformed into
one in which experts tried to persuade and ‘educate’ the public
in what is right and highly desirable for the future of the city.
The visions of the population and the architects clashed.
Citizens were concerned about housing problems and resto-
ration of local cultural places. Architects were preoccupied
with infrastructural and communicational facilities, which
comply with the logic of contemporary capitalism. They be-
lieved that space had to be open up for free movement of
goods, people, and services through building of areas with
investment potential. The architects themselves shared that
they wouldn’t have won the reconstruction contracts if their
plans had not offered such investment potential [2].
Conclusion
The text showed that recent foresight activities seek inclusion
of a broader profile of participants. They aim at aggregating
heterogeneous information in order to obtain an enriched
picture of the social reality and its possible futures. It is
difficult to understand the complexity of interaction between
the many realms of human activity and the perplexing causal
chains on which they operate. Therefore, the ‘encounter’ of
various perspectives, and even incompatible stances, is crucial
for the overall value of the process. Participatory foresight has
also been recognized as a means to alleviate the widely
discussed crisis of representative democracy and strengthen
the contended legitimacy of established power mechanisms
and structures.
Participatory foresight has its specific practical conse-
quences. Sometimes those drastically deviate from the initial
intentions, and create an illusion of empowering the public;
while at the same time devolves power holders’ responsibility
about the future downwards.
A question persists: is futures research actually making a
step forward to expanding its horizon beyond the enlightened
(the expert, the specialist) and beyond the initiated (in power),
or that transition into a fully-fledged foresight is still to come?
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and
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